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 Non-native species are invading foreign ecosystems at a rate that has never been seen 
before, and they cause significant damage to these ecosystems. In order to preserve species 
diversity, these invasive organisms are often eradicated.  Typically, conservation biologists run a 
cost-benefit analysis to determine what action they should take. In this project, I identify the 
need to also conduct ethical analyses. I chose three scenarios in which invasive species are 
eradicated: yellow crazy ants on Christmas Island, barred owls in the Pacific Northwest, and 
leafy spurge in the central United States. Each of these scenarios was analyzed using two ethical 
theories: utilitarianism and biophilia.  
 Ultimately, whether or not it is permissible to eradicate invasive species depends on the 
specific details of the situation. In most cases, it is permissible to use lethal control measures 
when it is the most cost-efficient option, or the fastest way to prevent future suffering. 
Additionally, lethal control is permissible when it is necessary to do so in order to preserve the 
biodiversity found within the ecosystem.   
  
Introduction: 
Philosophy and science frequently meet at an intersection dubbed “ethical analysis.” 
Ethics are generally thought of as practical, shared principles in various interactions, though it is 
a word often used interchangeably with morals. These analyses are an integral—and often 
invisible—part of applied science, conducted at an individual level any time a person takes an 
action that favors one stakeholder over another. Science is by no means exempt from 
philosophical considerations; value judgments lie at the center of things we would consider to be 
only pragmatic concerns. What we decide to study, the reports we seek to publish, the resources 
we conserve, what we experiment upon, and the methods used to go about this process all 
involve choices and have consequences associated with them. These consequences may include, 
but are not limited to, the way government money will be spent, the extent to which the 
environment will be manipulated, and the specific perspective cast upon a particular issue. 
Furthermore, any of these consequences can affect the well-being of both people and non-human 
organisms, and this is a moral concern.  
Inherent in the very study and practice of conservation biology are value judgments and 
ethical decisions; the name itself uses a term that implies normativity—the way things ought to 
be.  Conservation biologists determine which things ought to be conserved and saved based upon 
value judgments, then study and dictate the correct ways to ensure something is conserved. 
While not all normativity is moral, conservation is because it is based on value judgments that 
lead to actions that will impact the moral community. It does not matter whether these value 
judgments are implicit or explicit—when they are made, a person is doing ethics through their 
actions that are ultimately driven by their values and beliefs. It is worthwhile to thoroughly 
examine how these value judgments are being made so that we can ensure people consistently 
arrive at the proper conclusion and act in a morally sound manner.   
Ethical analyses—that is, examining a situation in a way that accounts for the community 
that will be impacted— are especially important when people aim to maintain an ecosystem’s 
health through culling an invasive species. An invasive species is often defined as a non-native 
or exotic organism that has caused or has the potential to cause damage to the local ecosystem, 
economy, or human health. The prevalence of invasive species has exploded with human 
globalization and people’s ability to travel to any location on the planet. Invasive species tend to 
outcompete native organisms, and have the potential to cause massive damage to the ecosystem. 
If left unchecked, these invaders can compromise the ecosystem’s ability to provide the services 
necessary for the continued existence of both people and non-human organisms (Simberloff 
2002). 
Within the realm of conservation biology, the eradication of invasive species remains a 
controversial issue among both the public and scientists. Scientists themselves tend to regard 
invasive species eradication as a bad idea for three primary reasons: this method is often 
regarded as unlikely to succeed, it may be costly (especially over large areas), and eradication 
may impose considerable collateral damage (Simberloff 2002). Incidentally, all of these concerns 
have ethical considerations. Even with these considerations, we still see many instances where 
eradication is presented as the only solution to a problem with invasive species.  
 To examine the morality of the actions taken in the name of conservation biology, 
particularly in the cases where the lethal control of non-human organisms is involved, I will 
apply two primary ethical theories: utilitarianism and the virtue ethics theory of biophilia. These 
two theories were chosen because they most closely resemble the intrinsic value judgments that 
occur in both conservation and preservation ethics. Conservation ethics aim to ensure that the 
earth’s natural resources are still available for human use, a value that closely resembles modern 
utilitarianism, which aims to maximize the amount of good for the greatest amount of beings. On 
the other hand, preservation ethics most closely resemble the virtue theory, biophilia. Biophilia 
aims to maintain ecosystem health regardless of how much use it would be for people.   
 The three situations I have identified for analysis primarily involve the lethal control of 
invasive species. Situation one occurs on Christmas Island where the invasive crazy ant has 
dramatically altered the natural ecosystem. The next case involves the invasive barred owl 
overtaking the habitat of spotted owls in the Pacific Northwest. The third situation is controlling 




  Consequentialism is “the view that normative properties depend only on consequences” 
(Sinnott-Armstrong 2011). More explicitly, consequentialism typically holds that whether or not 
an act is morally right depends only the consequences of that act. Utilitarianism is a specific type 
of consequentialism that claims “an act is morally right if and only if that act maximizes the 
good—typically defined as well-being, pleasure, or happiness—for the greatest number” 
(Sinnott-Armstrong 2011). The action we ought to take is the one that will yield the greatest 
amount of good after considering the negative consequences that will also arise from doing that 
act. Utilitarianism is often conceptualized as a way of thinking that seeks to maximize the 
greatest amount of good or utility for the greatest number of humans. However, utilitarianism 
was not originally designed with a central concern that people must be the benefactors of the 
good obtained by an action.  
 Jeremy Bentham first described the school of thought that became known as 
utilitarianism in 1781. In this first description of utilitarianism, the central focus was on hedonic 
pleasure and pain. Bentham claimed that pleasure and pain are the only things that should 
determine what we ought to do and what we shall do. Moreover, he believed we should take 
actions with consequences that will maximize pleasure and minimize pain. The method by which 
pleasure and pain are weighed became known as “hedonic calculus.” In its original form, a 
hedonic calculus made no rational distinction between the types of creatures that can experience 
these sensations—more specifically, it did not matter if an organism was human or not. The only 
criteria that truly mattered was whether or not an organism has the capacity to feel pain 
(Bentham 1781).  
The modern concept of utilitarianism often leaves out the considerations of non-human 
organisms all-together. This form of the theory takes it roots from one of Bentham’s students, 
John Stuart Mill. Mill’s description of utilitarianism focused considerably more on the utility of 
man, though Mill had originally intended to keep hedonic calculus of non-human organisms as 
part of the route to determining the action that will promote the most good (Mill 1863). 
However, with the increased focus on human considerations, scholars inevitably misinterpreted 
Mill’s theory to focus entirely upon anthropocentric pains and pleasures—this is the reason that 
most people tend to regard utilitarianism as an ethical theory that deals only with human utility.  
For the purposes of this analysis, I will be applying utilitarianism as it was originally 
intended—to include non-human organisms in the calculation. I intend to use the hedonic 
calculus when it applies, and welfare interests when the calculus may not apply, e.g., cases in 
which the invasive species charted for eradication is an organism we know cannot feel pain. 
Generally speaking, an organism can have two types of interests: preference interests and welfare 
interests. Preference interests indicate that one “has an interest in something, in the sense of 
wanting, desiring, preferring, or caring about that thing” (Baxter 2004). For example, an 
organism that is experiencing pain will prefer to not be in pain. One has a welfare interest in 
something when “it is in one’s interest that one have that thing, that is it has a positive effect on 
one’s good, welfare, or well-being” (Baxter 2004). For example, a tree cannot have a conscious 
preference interest in not being chopped down, but it is obvious that it is in the best interest of 
the tree to not get chopped down—in this respect, it has a welfare interest. In general, preference 
interests will be weighed more heavily than welfare interests. 
Utilitarianism does not exist without flaws, and it faces a variety of objections. One issue 
with this ethical theory is that it ignores the means by which an end is met; related to this 
concern, it also ignores an agent’s motive (Bentham 1781). Perhaps the most critical objection to 
utilitarianism lies within its focus on the consequences of an action. While we can foresee some 
of the consequences of an action, we cannot possibly foresee everything; we don’t know if we 
are doing the right action until after it has been done. This concern is especially prevalent when 
we are working with ecosystems—people often don’t have a complete understanding of how the 
system works, and identifying the trouble species can be very difficult in some cases.  
 
Biophilia 
In 1984, E.O. Wilson first coined the term biophilia. He described biophilia as an 
emotion—a person’s “innate tendency to focus on life and life-like processes” (Clowney 2013). 
Wilson believes humans are biologically wired to feel biophilia, though it can be fostered 
through learning and practice (Wilson 2007). Whether or not biophilia is innate is not an 
important consideration for my analysis. What is important is how this emotion can help or 
hinder our ability to make decisions within conservation efforts.  
 David Clowney introduces biophilia as an environmental virtue, and one that “has its 
status as a virtue by its contribution to human flourishing (eudemonia), while having care for live 
nature as its target, and care about live nature as its affective content” (Clowney 2013). Clowney 
describes a biophilic person as someone who will “honor, appreciate, learn about and seek to 
protect non-human life” (Clowney 2013). More importantly, biophilia should motivate people to 
examine—through science—the most effective ways to take care of non-human life. This 
disposition means that biophilia should motivate people to study ecology and other life sciences.  
There is an important difference between the justification and content of this virtue, and 
the two are not in conflict with one another. The care of non-human nature is the focus of the 
virtue because ultimately, without caring for and about earth’s ecosystems, humans cannot 
flourish—we rely on ecosystems to provide us with vital ecosystem services. This environmental 
virtue cannot have human flourishing as its focus, because it would result in bad actions that only 
promote human interests. If the virtue focused only on human flourishing, people would be 
justified in destroying ecosystems to obtain short-term benefits, which would only promote 
equally short-term flourishing for people. 
Virtue ethics takes its roots from Aristotle, who believed that emotions are inherently tied 
to the motivation to action—emotions guide us to the things we believe are important. He also 
thought that emotions played an important role in guiding us toward morality, and as such 
believed emotion should be fostered as an intermediate condition between two states: one 
involving excess, and the other deficiency (Kruat 2014). This intermediate became known as the 
golden mean. Additionally, Aristotle believed that virtues were no different from technical skills: 
a skilled worker knows how to avoid both excess and deficiency and maintain an intermediate 
condition. A famous example of the golden mean is courage. Courage is an emotion that exists 
between two extremes (vices): cowardice and rashness. Without enough confidence, one is 
cowardly and so overwhelmed with fear that one cannot act when it is necessary. On the other 
hand, if one is too confident and does not feel enough fear, one will be prone to make rash and 
foolish decisions.  However, when one’s emotions exist in this middle condition, one will not be 
so cowardly that one cannot act, nor will one be so rash that one takes unnecessary risks while 
acting (Kruat 2014). 
In this manner, emotions became an integral part of virtue ethics; we must practice 
controlling our emotions, and we must also have the practical wisdom to know how to properly 
act upon our emotions (Kruat 2014). To properly foster biophilia, a modern community must rely 
on its own set of practical wisdom: the current scientific knowledge about ecology, biodiversity 
loss, and human environmental impact (Clowney 2013).  
Wilson’s conceptualization of biophilia as an emotion is also subject to the golden mean: 
one should foster enough biophilia to care about the presence and well-being of non-human 
organisms, but not so much that action will not be taken at all if it requires the death of a non-
human organism. When one does not foster enough biophilia—an amount below the Golden 
Mean, one will simply not care at all for non-human life, and will be content with whatever 
happens to it—including its continued destruction from human activity and invasive species. On 
the other hand, when one experiences too much biophilia—an amount above the Golden Mean, 
one’s love of non-human life may be so strong that one is paralyzed when faced with the 
possibility that a population of non-human organisms must be culled for the health of an 
ecosystem. With the correct amount of biophilia—the golden mean—one will care for non-
human and strive to protect it, and will accept that there will be situations in which a population 
of non-human organisms must be culled to maintain the health of the larger community. 
Above all else, biophilia aims to protect the environment—in particular, it seeks to 
protect biodiversity. Biodiversity matters for what it means for the ecosystem as a whole; to 
protect biodiversity only for biodiversity’s sake would be another example of harboring excess 
biophilia. Fortunately, biodiversity is often used as an indicator of ecosystem health. One 
description of a healthy ecosystem is a system that is “stable and sustainable, maintaining its 
organization and autonomy over times and its resilience to stress” (Rapport et all 1998).  Some 
common assessments of ecosystem health are vigor, organization, and resilience – all of which 
already incorporate biodiversity to some degree. The activity, metabolism, or primary 
productivity within an ecosystem comprise an ecosystem’s vigor. Organization is assessed as the 
number of interactions between the organisms in an ecosystem, as well as the diversity of 
organisms found within an ecosystem. Resilience is a system’s capacity to function and maintain 
structure in the presence of stress. The point at which resilience is exceeded is known as an 
ecosystem’s tipping point – the point beyond which the system has changed into an alternate, 
unfamiliar state (Rapport et al 1998). Many different studies have shown that biodiversity is 
extremely important to an ecosystem’s resilience. 
However, biodiversity is not the only metric we can use to assess the health of an 
ecosystem, and in some cases, using only this measure can lead us to the wrong action, e.g., 
situations in which an invasive species is increasing biodiversity even though it is drastically 
altering the ecosystem. A biophilic person who is using practical wisdom will be able to identify 
cases when biodiversity is not the proper metric. In situations such as these, a different measure 
of ecosystem health should be used. Additional measures include an ecosystem’s ability to 
provide essential ecosystem services, which can decrease when an ecosystem is out of balance. 
Given that biophilia itself aims to protect biodiversity, some people might think that it 
then logically follows that we ought to kill the entirety of humanity who is responsible for the 
overwhelming majority of the current mass extinction. However, this solution does not hold, and 
it is not what biophilia calls for. Biophilia is justified as a virtue through its contribution to 
human flourishing, and it is quite obvious that in death, a person cannot thrive.  
 
Scenarios: 
Anoplolepis gracilipes: The yellow crazy ant on Christmas Island 
Problem overview: 
Yellow crazy ants, Anoplolepis gracilipes are listed among the most troublesome of all 
known invasive species. Their impacts have been felt on virtually every tropical island on the 
planet. However, no place is burdened more heavily by the impacts of this invasive species than 
Christmas Island, an island located in the northeastern Indian Ocean.  
The island supports a forest characterized by tall trees and the absence of underbrush; the 
forest floor’s litter is managed by the system’s keystone species, the red land crab, Gecarcoidea 
natalis. A keystone species is defined as a native species whose absence results in a massive 
alteration of the local ecosystem. These crabs play a key role in regulating seedling recruitment, 
the composition of seedlings, the density of litter invertebrates, and litter breakdown (O’Dowd et 
al. 2003). With the loss of seedling regulation, there is an increase in the biodiversity of the 
forest, although the composition of the plant life becomes predominantly invasive species 
(O’Dowd et al. 2003).  
These invasive ants pose a significant problem on Christmas Island because they kill the 
red land crabs, whose role is vital to maintaining the ecosystem’s functionality. Estimates 
suggest that these invaders have killed 10-15 million red crabs, as much as one-third of its total 
population (O’Dowd et al. 2003). Crazy ants are found in supercolonies, which allows them to 
gain the numerical dominance necessary to completely overhaul the entire forest ecosystem on 
the island (Abbott 2005). A 2002 estimate stated that approximately 28% of the rainforest on the 
island was occupied by the yellow crazy ant (Abbott 2005).  
The options for control are to take no action, work for total eradication using pesticides, 
or to use aerial baiting to decrease the ant population to a point that it is not high enough to cause 
harm to the red crabs and the ecosystem. All of these options have been proposed by the park 
service on the island, and I will examine the method that is currently in use—aerial baiting.  
 
Utilitarian Perspective: 
The utilitarian analysis of the situation focused strictly upon the consequences that come 
from both the ants’ presence on the island in addition to the techniques that will be used to 
remove them. One of the primary consequences of the ants living on the island is the removal of 
a keystone species, the red crabs. As stated previously, these crabs play a crucial role in 
managing the forest floor’s litter. Without these crabs, the entire forest ecosystem changes into 
one that favors invasive species and displaces native species.  
The crazy ant kills red crabs primarily through the use of formic acid, which is sprayed 
into the mouths of the crabs, and causes death within forty-eight hours—a significant period of 
suffering (O’Dowd et al. 2003). Historically, there has been some contention in the literature 
regarding the status of crustaceans and the ability to feel pain. However, emerging literature has 
cast new light upon the situation, and several studies have gathered evidence that suggests that 
crustaceans can feel pain (Elwood et al. 2009). Through the way that crazy ants impact the 
ecosystem, by extension, they also impact the people who live on the island and the industries 
that rely on the pristine status of the ecosystem, such as the ecotourism industry.  
In addition to the consequences associated with the ants’ presence itself, a utilitarian will 
also be concerned with the suffering and pleasure that could come from the management 
practices used to eradicate this invasive species. Current management practices involve placing 
poisonous bait in areas that have high crazy ant activity. Boland et al. (2011) studied one such 
eradication campaign in which low concentration (0.01g/kg) fipronil (an insecticide) bait was 
deposited from a helicopter onto target supercolonies, which can cover several meters (O’Dowd 
et al 2003). The campaign was an overwhelming success; within a week of baiting, ant densities 
declined by an average 79.3%. The densities had decreased by 98.4% by the end of four weeks 
(Boland et al. 2011).  
The method was not only successful, but it also had very few impacts on non-target 
species. In Christmas Island National Park, only supercolonies of crazy ants are subject to 
management practices. With the high ant densities, the toxic bait doesn’t remain on the ground 
where it could be taken up by other species. Additionally, before the bait was deployed, the park 
rangers set traps to prevent the native nomadic robber crab from entering a supercolony and 
consuming the insecticide. These measures prevented virtually all unwanted damage to non-
target species. Furthermore, because the concentration of fipronil was so low (ten times less than 
the concentration that had been used before this particular campaign), there was no residual 
concentration found in the soil even two years after the bait had been used.  
An additional concern is the cost of the eradication campaign. The estimates for the type 
of control described above are between $7,000-$12,000 per treatment of numerous colonies 
(Vanderwoude et al. 2006). Utilitarians consider the other uses this money could have gone 
towards—in this case—the other conservation efforts or scientific endeavors that could have 
been funded in place of the eradication effort. Because of the way crazy ant populations are 
managed—that is, they are only treated with the bait when they reach a high density of ants, 
described as 1000s of ants per m2, it is a reasonable cost to bear, especially when considering the 
overwhelmingly positive consequences of removing the invasive ants(O’Dowd et al 2003).  
 
Biophilic Perspective: 
 When evaluating the culling of crazy ants through biophilia, we must consider the metric 
to use—it is clear that biodiversity is not the best metric to use. Without the presence of red crabs 
that control the litter on the forest floor, the seeds of invasive plants are free to take root, and 
these invaders harm the ecosystem. A better metric to use could be the resilience of the 
ecosystem (Rapport et al 1998). By using this metric, it becomes very clear that the presence of 
crazy ants has a negative impact on the ecosystem—without the keystone crab species, the 
ecosystem changes in a positive feedback loop. It will take time for the ecosystem to recover 
from the changes, whereas with the presence of keystone species, the ecosystem can recover 
from the invasion of plant species—which likely would not be able to sprout altogether.   
The impact of the crazy ant are felt in the canopy of the forest as well. Many ant species 
enjoy mutualistic relationships with scale insects that generate honeydew. Due to the large 
masses of crazy ants on the island, the population of scale insects also explodes, resulting in the 
overproduction of honeydew and resultant growth of sooty molds on the leaves of trees—which 
serve to decrease photosynthesis, and cause dieback. 
When the crazy ants are eradicated from infested areas of the island, the ecosystem 
reverts back to its original state. The red crabs return to the forest floor and regulate the litter, 
preventing the growth of invasive plant species and maintaining the sparing underbrush that 
should be present in the healthy ecosystem.  
Both utilitarianism and biophilia favor culling the crazy ants with low-level insecticides 
applied via aerial baiting, though they do so for slightly different reasons. The utilitarian calculus 
favors their removal due to the negative changes to the ecosystem that result from the ants’ 
presence, in addition to the suffering endured by numerous red land crabs. Additionally, the 
proposed removal methods themselves carry positive consequences such as reverting the 
ecosystem back to its original state for a relatively low cost, and doing so with very few negative 
impacts such as harming non-target species. While there is the negative consequence associated 
with denying the welfare interests of the ants, the suffering of the ecosystem as a whole and the 
individuals within it outweighs any suffering endured by the ants.  
A biophilic person will also favor culling the ants. It is clear that this invasive species 
drastically changes the ecosystem in a way that compromises its integrity and resilience through 
the removal of members of the keystone species. This creates a situation which allows numerous 
invasive plants to take root. While the ants do increase the biodiversity of the system, it is not a 
positive increase, as it decreases the stability of the ecosystem.  
   
Strix occidentalis vs. Strix varia: Spotted owls vs. barred owls 
Problem Overview: 
The spotted owl’s range extends from British Columbia through the Cascade Mountains 
and coastal regions in Washington, Oregon, and California. This species has been listed as 
threatened under the Endangered Species Act since 1990. Annual surveys continue to indicate 
that the spotted owl population is in decline in most of eleven study areas. The population as a 
whole declines at a rate of 2.9 percent per year. There are two primary factors that threaten the 
owls’ survival: habitat loss to timber harvest and fire, and competition from barred owls 
(USFWS 2013).  
 The barred owl is a species of owl that is not native in the western United States. Due to 
land change in the buffering zone that had separated the two owl species, the barred owl was able 
to encroach upon the spotted owls’ territory. Barred owls are larger, more aggressive, and more 
adaptable. They compete with spotted owls for resources such as nesting sites and food, and 
often outcompete the native species. Because the population of spotted owls is already so 
vulnerable, this additional threat has increased the rate of spotted owl decline (USFWS 2013). 
The Oregon Fisheries and Wildlife Services has conducted an environmental impact 
statement that listed several different ways the barred owls could be removed, including non-
lethal and lethal methods. These options include capture and permanent captivity, while the 
lethal methods include killing the barred owls on site with a shotgun.  
 Further complicating the issue is that the barred owls are protected under the Migratory 
Bird Treaty Act of 1918. In order to manage the population of this invasive species, the Fisheries 
and Wildlife Service must obtain a permit to capture or kill the barred owl.  
 
Utilitarian Perspective: 
For utilitarians, the most important moral consideration when examining management 
practices is the suffering of both species of owls. The Oregon Fisheries and Wildlife Services 
supported lethal removal procedures over non-lethal methods. A utilitarian views death as 
morally neutral; what matters is the suffering that comes with death. The organization justifies its 
decision by saying lethal methods are “considered the best way to minimize the potential for 
trauma, pain, and suffering because it is most likely to result in instantaneous death” (USFWS 
2013). Every effort is made to use lethal practices that are safe, humane, and efficient to reduce 
the risk of unnecessary injury to barred owls and other species (USFWS 2013). This suffering 
must be weighed against the suffering endured by the spotted owls when they are displaced from 
their territory. It seems that the suffering of spotted owls is greater than that of the barred owl, 
because displacement from their territory is likely to result in a long period of suffering which 
may include starvation.  
From this comparison, it seems that the suffering of the spotted owl will outweigh the 
suffering of the barred owl. In the current management regime, while barred owls are killed, it is 
done in a way that ensures the animals do not suffer. Whereas, when spotted owls are pushed out 
of their territory, these animals have to deal with a death may come as a result of starvation. In 
this way, it seems that culling the barred owls is the right thing to do in order to avoid a large 
amount of suffering.  
A utilitarian is also very concerned with the cost of the management solution. The 
proposed removal of barred owls carry a cost between $400,000-$12 million per campaign, 
depending upon which specific method is used (lethal control or non-lethal capture) (USFWS 
2013). It will take numerous removal procedures to reduce the number of barred owls to the 
point that the spotted owl can adequately recover, which indicates a long term commitment of a 
considerably large amount of money.  
A utilitarian generally thinks about the monetary cost of an action through a particular 
lens in the case of funding for scientific endeavors, by asking the question: of all the diversity of 
projects that need funding, why should all of that money go to this particular endeavor? When 
added all together, this one project will require an enormous amount of money which could be 
used to fund numerous other conservation efforts. For example, instead of conserving just one 
species—the spotted owl—that funding could be spent to conserve many different species. The 
funding could also be given to medical research, which would benefit a large number of people. 
The sheer cost does not justify removing the barred owls, because there are so few benefits 
gained from preserving the spotted owls.  
 
Biophilic perspective: 
When looking at the situation from the perspective of biophilia, it is important to look at 
how the barred owls’ presence impacts the ecosystem as a whole. It seems that there are very few 
impacts to the environment as a result of the barred owl invasion. The barred owl and spotted 
owl occupy the same niche within the ecosystem of the northwestern forest. In fact, the two 
species are so similar in niche and relation that they can hybridize and produce fertile offspring 
(Haig et al 2004).  
Spotted owls and barred owls occupy the same niche; the noticeable difference between 
the two species is the aggressive nature of the larger barred owl. It is not likely that the barred 
owl will carry adverse consequences to the ecosystem or other species that reside within its 
habitat. The barred owl only impacts the spotted owl. Because biophilia does not aim to 
maximize biodiversity, it is not justified to remove the barred owl. The barred owl is not a threat 
to the integrity of the ecosystem. 
Although, it may be the case that because this owl is larger than its native counterpart, it 
will consume more prey. However, the nature of predator-prey relationships will dictate that the 
barred owl never consumes so many that it risks dismantling the ecosystem. The dynamics of a 
predator-prey relationship is such that the predator’s population is always controlled by the 
prey’s population. When there are more prey animals available, the predator’s population will 
also increase. However, should the prey’s population fall,  the predator’s population will crash to 
reflect the circumstances of food availability (Ricklefs and Relyea 2015).  
From the analysis above, humans are not justified in removing barred owls to save the 
spotted owl, primarily due to the enormous cost of the efforts that could be spent elsewhere on 
other types of research. Additionally, there are few consequences associated with the presence of 
the barred owl—its impacts are felt only by the spotted owl. The barred owl is not a threat to the 
ecosystem’s functionality, as it displaces the spotted owl and occupies that niche in the 
ecosystem. 
However, it is worth noting that utilitarianism may reach a different conclusion. A 
utilitarian may perceive the human happiness that arises from the existence of spotted owls (its 
existence value) as a utility that outweighs the monetary cost of managing the population of 
barred owls. This discrepancy demonstrates a problem within the theory of consequentialism: it 
is incredibly difficult to determine weigh different classes of consequences against one another. 
In this particular case, those two classes are human happiness against the monetary cost of 
removing the barred owl. It is an interesting problem that arises, as utilitarianism and biophilia 
only reach different conclusions when we consider a more human element in the calculus.  
 Euphorbia esula: Leafy Spurge 
Problem Overview:  
Leafy spurge is an invasive (noxious) weed found primarily throughout the Midwestern 
and Western United States. The plant is native to parts of Europe and Asia; its exact route to the 
United States remains unknown. This plant poses a significant problem in prairie ecosystems, 
where it shades out native species and produces a chemical that prevents other plants from 
growing near it. Additionally, this invasive species is a serious problem for people who are using 
rangeland to graze animals; leafy spurge produces a toxic substance that acts an irritant, emetic, 
and purgative when consumed by livestock (Lym and Kirby 1987).  
 Leafy spurge presents significant economic impacts that stem from its impact on the 
forage availability for cattle. Estimates blame this invasive plant for as much as $120 million in 
lost cattle production in Montana, North Dakota, South Dakota, and Wyoming. An additional 
estimate places a $10 million annual loss in nonagricultural industries such as recreation and 
watersheds in this four-state area (Hansen, et al. 1997).  
 This plant’s presence also imposes negative consequences on the ecosystem. Infestations 
significantly reduce the abundance of native prairie plants, which in turn has a negative impact 
on wildlife populations whose habitats are changed by this invader. In addition, the plant 
produces a toxic substance that harms certain herbivores that consume it (Hansen, et al. 1997). 
 Leafy spurge is a persistent weed, and difficult to fully remove from an infected area. The 
driving force behind removing leafy spurge is to increase cattle production and to maintain the 
status of the native plant population. There are two primary control methods available for this 
invader: the use of herbicides or biological control agents. A utilitarian will be primarily 
concerned with the use of herbicides, the use of which can carry many tangible consequences. 
Most herbicide options will control up to 70% of unwanted leafy spurge. Depending upon the 
size of the infestation, herbicide application can be very cost effective, with the options ranging 
from $30-$40 per hectare, though it takes multiple annual applications to reach and maintain the 
desired level of control. However, herbicides will impact non-target species that come into 
contact with it (Lym 1998). 
 
Utilitarianian Perspective:  
A utilitarian is concerned with the consequences that arise from the presence of leafy 
spurge, the majority of which are negative. The plant produces a toxin that harms livestock, 
which causes them to suffer the unpleasant experiences associated with its ingestion—vomiting 
and irritation. Additionally, that toxin prevents other plants from growing, ensuring a 
monoculture of leafy spurge, which is unpalatable to livestock.  
The impacts of this noxious weed on livestock has serious implications for human 
wellbeing. If the invasive plant is found in a rancher’s pasture, it can cause them to lose a 
considerable amount of money—either through reduced cattle production, or more directly 
through the costs associated with managing it. Ranchers partake in a profession that does not 
grant them very much disposable income, and so any reduction in profit or additional inputs to 
their grazing system may have a large impact on the quality of life for the rancher themselves as 
well as anyone who is dependent upon that income.  
Both utilitarianism and biophilia are concerned with the consequences that will arise from 
biological control. There are innumerable causes wherein a non-native organism was introduced 
to control an invasive species, but instead wreaked havoc on the ecosystem or preferred to target 
a different species altogether. Insects are the primary type of biological control agent available 
for leafy spurge. The insects themselves are considered an invasive species, and must be closely 
monitored and studied to ensure that they will only target leafy spurge.  
 According to the study by Lym, a population of flea beetles has had the greatest success 
with biological control, because its larvae feed on the root system of leafy spurge. The adults can 
be easily captured and transported to another location to establish a new population. However, 
the study has also found that five years after the initial flea beetle release, there has not been an 
increase in the production of the native grass species. An additional issue with this form of 
control is that is only effective in conjunction with another type, such as herbicide use (Lym 
1998). 
 
Biophilic Perspective:  
A biophilic analysis is concerned with the way that leafy spurge decreases biodiversity in 
a rangeland or prairie setting. In ecosystems like these, biodiversity is a key indicator of the 
health of the system, as the more plant species that are present in the area can support more types 
of organisms. Leafy spurge decreases the biodiversity of these systems through its use of toxins 
to prevent other plants from growing near it. In turn, it can form a monoculture within a pasture 
and reduce the available forage and habitat for the organisms that depend upon it. In order to 
protect the integrity of the system, it is necessary to remove leafy spurge from the area. In this 
way, removal is justified. 
 In this case, both methods of analysis reach the same conclusion: that people are justified 
in the removal of leafy spurge, so long as the control methods used do not cause more harm than 
good for the ecosystem as a whole. The economic loss attributed to leafy spurge in addition to 
the hardships experienced by ranchers when this noxious weed invades their fields justifies the 
removal of this weed. Additionally, the plant’s ability to outcompete native species and 
monopolize a field  reduces the productivity, resilience, and biodiversity of the ecosystem and 
ought to be removed. Plants introduce a unique problem into ethical analyses, in that the 
suffering of the species being removed is not a consideration. Careful analysis is then needed to 
ensure that removing the plant will indeed be good for all parties involved, both human and not. 
 
Summary and Conclusion 
 Conservation biologists who aim to manage invasive species should take measures to 
ensure that the actions they take are morally permissible, especially when they propose  killing a 
large number of organisms they have deemed unwanted within an ecosystem. The primary goal 
of this research was to identify the circumstances under which it is permissible for people to use 
lethal control measures to eliminate invasive species from an ecosystem. Two ethical theories, 
utilitarianism and biophilia were used to analyze three cases in which invasive species are 
eradicated in order to determine if the action is indeed justified.  
The answer I gathered from this series of analyses is that the permissibility of eradication 
regimes depends upon the specific details of the situation. Utilitarianism showed that it is 
permissible to use lethal control measures when the positive consequences of doing so outweigh 
the negative consequences. The use of this theory is helpful in making decisions about the action 
to take because it is easy to see what ought to be done in order to maximize the pleasure and 
happiness of all the creatures in the moral community whilst minimizing their suffering. 
However, in some cases it is difficult to weigh consequences against one another, as was the case 
in the barred owl situation. It is hard to determine what action to take when it may increase 
human happiness, but at an enormous cost.  
With biophilia, it is permissible to eradicate invasive species when the members of that 
species pose a significant threat to the ecosystem. In the analyses, a significant threat was 
presented as a dramatic change in the ecosystem that compromises its ability to function 
properly—as was the case in the crazy ant. Additionally, in the case of leafy spurge, when an 
invasive species decreases the biodiversity of an ecosystem, it is permissible to eradicate it.  
Using these two ethical theories has shown that even when people have different reasons 
for taking a certain action or value different things, we can still reach the same conclusion—it is 
not necessary to fully adopt either one exclusively, because our reasons can come from different 
places. Occasionally, these two theories will reach different conclusions, as was mentioned in the 
analysis of the barred and spotted owls. Typically, the disagreement is caused by considering a 
more anthropocentric element such as economic reasons, or specifically on the basis of suffering.  
Ethical analyses are a useful tool to use in addition to the more traditional use of cost-
benefit analyses for conservation biologists. Especially when conservation biologists are trying 
to determine the fate of members of an invasive species, it is important to take a step back to 
analyze the situation from an ethical standpoint. It can help ensure that all of the values and 
perspectives have been taken into consideration, and it may help to eliminate sources of bias. 
Additionally, examining the situation from an ethical perspective can provide additional 
justification for the actions that are taken.  
In future research, different ethical theories should be used. I chose two theories out of a 
large variety, and it would be interesting so analyze these same situations with different ethical 
theories, to see how the answers change given the relevant considerations. Additionally, different 
scenarios should be analyzed—the scenarios I chose for this research had fairly clear answers, 
and it would be better to analyze scenarios that are more complicated because they have more 
ethical considerations to take into account.  
A more pluralistic approach should be taken in order to conduct these ethical analyses. I 
treated utilitarianism and biophilia as though their ethical considerations were exclusive, 
however there is a lot more overlap than I showed in this paper. Additionally, there is value to 
analyzing situations using many different ethical theories, because people generally approach 
ethics pluralistically and do not adhere to only one specific theory.  
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